See, for example, Justin Bronk, "Is the Russian Air Force Actually Incapable of Complex Air Operations?, " RUSI Defence Systems, 4 March 2022; Phillips Payson O'Brien and Edward Stringer, "The Overlooked Reason Russia's Invasion Is Floundering, " Atlantic, 9 May 2022; and Michael Kofman et al., Russian Military Strategy: Core Tenets and Operational Concepts (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2021), 21–25. Moreover, the risk represented by a further escalation of the conflict should not be underestimated. The following is a must-watch from several nights ago: And, staggeringly, more than 30 Russian municipal deputies have signed a petition calling for Russian President Vladimir Putin's resignation. Now that it's become common knowledge, it's weird the authors make no mention of it. Stockpiles of ammunition have been left for Ukrainian use. Unlike their enemy, the Ukrainians have developed a coherent concept of air operations, one that has allowed them to block what looked like an easy path to Russian air dominance. Ukrainians are now full of positivity, fighting for their freedom, for the homeland, for their families and future. The overlooked reason russia's invasion is floundering a bit. Ukraine picked their spots perfectly. Open-source intelligence will play a growing tactical and strategic role in the war in Ukraine. Advancing in three places, the Ukrainians made slow but meaningful progress. First and foremost, "Russian ground offensive appears to have been planned and executed based on poor assumptions about how the Ukrainian military - and the population - would respond" (Jones, 2022). Yet, while the war is unique, it is not unique in being unique, and its lessons are neither totally new nor a mere continuation of the past. Other videos surfaced too, as well as a photograph showing military trucks hiding under the building. "Attack on Europe. "
Huge numbers of APCs and IFVs (armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles), tanks and other specialist vehicles. However, it is reasonable to hypothesize that these are the objectives currently pursued by the actors involved in the conflict. In particular, the Soviet-inherited, rigid and top-down command structure slew down the decision-making process while the fear of failure affected experimentation and flexibility. However, there have been a number of interesting articles, and I've assembled a rather subjective list of them. Instead of an organized withdrawal, Ukrainian forces chose to fiercely fight for their territory, which led some analysts to observe that their strategy resembled one of attrition. The overlooked reason russia's invasion is floundering will. Russia's image of military and economic power would be replaced by that of a defeated and isolated Power, causing a downgrade of its international rank.
Joseph Gedeon, Why prosecuting Russian war crimes in Ukraine could be complicated, POLITICO, Apr. To make matters worse for Russia, while they are in such a precarious position, their neighbors are being opportunistic: there have been clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia concerning the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. There was, per the Lancet, a clear "association between extremely fast and extensive privatization (so-called mass privatization) with higher working-age male mortality, suggesting that unemployment was a primary mechanism linking privatization and premature deaths. Attacks against supply lines were another priority target for the Ukrainian military. Elizabeth Braw, Ukraine's Digital Fight Goes Global, Foreign Affairs, May 2, 2022. Achieving a victory on the field would serve to demonstrate the inefficiency of the Russian military, the country's only real strength in the past. In particular, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) has proven quite effective given its high precision (Stavridis, 2022). But the real value of a drone is not that it can do some things better than a manned aircraft—it is that it can do things that, without a drone, could not be done at all, because there is no aerial alternative. This trend can be reinforced by another: the advent of real-time, open-source intelligence. Source: courtesy of Viewsridge, adapted by MCUP. The overlooked reason russia's invasion is floundering their way. Intelligence can come from classified sources or be open-source intelligence (OSINT), which is intelligence derived from public sources of all means, to include newspapers, social networks, television, radio, and more. The list is too long to detail, but the highlights are: - Longer-range artillery than the Russians have. "List of Aircraft Losses during the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine.
Beardsworth J., "Despite Modernization Drive, Russia's air force struggles for Superiority in Ukraine", The Moscow Times, Oct 27th 2022, 2-A. And then, everything happens all at once. The main use of drones in the war in Ukraine has not been to kill the enemy, but rather to help other units or equipment do the killing. The Overlooked Reason Why Russia Can't Control Ukraine's Skies. See, for example, Alex Vershinin, "Feeding the Bear: A Closer Look at Russian Army Logistics and the Fait Accompli, " War on the Rocks, 23 November 2021; and Grau and Bartles, The Russian Way of War, 322–57. On 29th August 2022, Ukraine launched a counter-offensive aimed at re-capturing Kherson and its region. Abstract: This article deals with the tactical lessons of the first six months of the Russian war in Ukraine.
Within 24 hours it was destroyed by Ukrainian forces, who then thanked "Russian propagandists" for the "tip" on the location of the mortar. 78 A remarkable case of Ukrainian use of defensive artillery and a failure of Russian offensive artillery can be seen in the failed Russian bridgehead near Bilohorivka in early May 2022, where several dozen armored personnel carriers, tanks, and other vehicles were destroyed. 4 (October 2020), - Robert F. Dorr, "DIVAD Wasn't a 'Cure All, ' after All, " Defense Media Network, 23 October 2012; and Terry Gander, The Bofors Gun (Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Books, 2015), 241–44. Another possible reason was the incapacity by the Russian forces to secure critical lines of communication and protect logistics vehicles from attacks by enemy forces (Jones, 2022) while "the quantity and the quality assets were lower than anticipated because of corruption at all levels in the command chain" (Skoglund, Listou, Ekstrom, 2022). Zeroing In on Pass-Through | Q&A With Chief of Space Operations | DOD, NASA Partnership. In October 2022, the Ukrainian news channel Volia made an independent count and reached the conclusion that the total number of Russian soldiers killed, missing, and captured since the beginning of the war was between 60, 580 and 66, 487. With almost 4, 000 combat aircraft and extensive experience bombing targets in Syria, Georgia, and Chechnya, Russia's air force was expected to play a vital role in the invasion, allowing the Russian army to plunge deep into Ukraine, seize Kyiv, and destroy the Ukrainian military. Moreover, Ukraine resorted to "guerilla warfare" tactics (hit and run or ambushes) to attack Russia's forces and logistics. See Jim Wilson, "Smart Weapons under Fire, " Popular Mechanics 180 (July 2003): 43. Missiles in Ukrainian Hands, " NDTV, 4 March 2022. But Ukraine lost almost nothing since—by September, only two more SAM systems and three more radars were lost, with one of the radars abandoned.
As the Ukrainian army improves, the Russian army deteriorates, and this trend only goes one way. While all intelligence remains important to military operations, the war in Ukraine has shown the rising significance of open-source intelligence and commercial intelligence. The Ukrainian forces are now taking a breather on the Oskil River, a natural defensive line for the Russians to fall back on. These sorts of combined operations involve hundreds of aircraft and thousands of people in a tightly choreographed dance that takes a lifetime to master. The Ukraine crisis and the international law of armed conflict (LOAC): some Q & A, Lawfire, Feb. 27, 2022. The Germans lost the Battle of Britain, and unable to attain air supremacy, gave up on the idea of invading. Army Nuclear Doctrine, 1945–1980 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980; New York: Routledge, 2019), 116–17, - See, for example, Fred Kaplan, "No, You're Not Imagining It: Russia's Army Is Inept, " Slate, 28 February 2022; and Stefan Hedlund, "The Collapse of the Russian Military Machine, " GIS Reports, 2 May 2022. Indeed, this was reflected in the decision to deploy only 140, 000 soldiers, among the Battalion Tactical Groups and irregular forces, significantly less than Ukraine's 250. But their efforts were simply not good enough. What to read about the Ukraine crisis? 30 articles for your consideration –. Share and discuss Україна and her glorious people, history, geography, language, art, culture, values, and experiences during wartime. Not only that, but there are no signs that they are operational in Ukraine.
Bowen S., "Russia's War in Ukraine: Military and Intelligence Aspects", Congressional Research Center, Sep 14th 2022, 1-A. And much, much more. Being able to use open-source intelligence and the private initiative of professionals and enthusiasts who do not belong to any military force and sometimes are not related at all to either side of the conflict can be a great asset to those who know how to pull data from social media platforms and other open sources, filter it, and use it for military purposes. Ukrainian forces showed surprising strength in the air war, and adapted as the fighting progressed. Both forces continue to operate in the field, with a high percentage of attacks being made by unguided bombs and short-range missiles, as neither Russia nor Ukraine is up to the Western standard of employing precision-guided munitions (PGMs), despite being stocked with some modern Western weapons such as the AGM-88 HARM high-speed antiradiation missile. It is worth noting that Russian has also failed to achieve numerical superiority in Ukraine, and that Ukraine's personnel superiority has played an important role in the war. Other definitions include geospatial intelligence. This would be a more realistic objective, the achievement of which has been made even closer by the Russian retreat from Kherson. It is possible, after all, that Russian loses do not represent the inability of tanks to perform. Diver, AV, "NATO's Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA) Concept: Past, Present and Future" (research paper, U. 000 soldiers (Davydenko, Khostova, Lymar, 2022), compared to more than 250. For the anti-war Left, who had insisted that no siege would come to pass, a hyper fixation on the encroachment of NATO onto Russia's border — a perspective that neglects President Vladimir Putin's blood and soil angle in favor of broad (though not entirely unjustifiable) "America bad" rhetoric. This should serve as a warning to Western militaries who have become accustomed to complete aerial superiority.
We are at war, so content is tightly moderated to keep our community safe. In particular, instead of massing in large formations and having each attack/movement managed by central command, Ukrainian fighters dispersed and launched hit and run attacks or set up ambushes hitting Russian forces from different angles using shoulder-fired anti-tank weapons. An antitank team could fire a missile toward an area where an enemy was spotted by a drone, locking onto the target once the missile was close enough, without ever seeing the target but knowing where to look. Apparently, they suffered heavy losses to defend the Luhansk Oblast. This combination of privatization and austerity mangled the very social fabric of Russian society, resulting in a collective sense of despair that ricocheted through the general population. 56 By 2006, Israel had retired its Machbet self-propelled antiaircraft gun, carrying a 20-millimeter M61 Vulcan cannon and Stinger missiles; by 2012, it phased out the last infantry-carried Stingers. Indeed, NATO has helped Ukraine to shift from the inherited, rigid Soviet-style command structures and standards to Western ones (Kuzio, 2022), which was reflected in the creation of non-commissioned officers (who provide links among senior officers so that the latter do not need to go to the battlefield) and in the flexibility of the command structure (both aspects are lacking in Soviet-style command structures) (Kuzio, 2022).
While morale among Russian soldiers is low, Ukrainians "are fighting for their homes and families, so you would expect them to be more motivated than their Russian counterparts" (Glantz, 2022). "Gepard, Cheetah, PRTL, " Weapon Systems, accessed 24 October 2022; and "Starstreak Anti-Aircraft Guided Missile System, " Army Technology, 29 October 2015. And with cuts to social spending came crises in healthcare and education. Air forces are dependent on an array of technologies that require highly trained personnel who can quickly set up what amounts to an airborne military ecosystem: airborne radar stations to provide command and control, fighters to protect and police the skies, refueling aircraft to keep everyone full of gas, electronic-warfare planes to keep enemy defenses suppressed, and a range of intelligence-gatherers and attack aircraft to locate and destroy enemy forces.
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