¶ 1 Before this Court is the appeal of The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States and J. Should get the money. Summary judgment was fully warranted. The court ruled that the 1973 Will, although legally revoked by Manfred's remarriage, nonetheless sufficed to create a valid nontestamentary trust when read in conjunction with the policies' beneficiary designations. The equitable life assurance company. As the Third Circuit observed in Jackman, "Manifestly, the will [is] not intended to operate testamentarily in such regard. " 320, 324, 168 N. 804 (1929); see also Montague v. Hayes, 76 Mass.
Next, the understanding by the recipient as intended to be applied to the plaintiff. Dawson v. White & Case, 88 N. Y. They are in no wise modified or increased at the time of the death of the insured. Donald R. Peck, with whom David R. Schmahmann and Nutter, McClennen & Fish, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellee Equitable Life Assur. 178, 186-88, 146 N. 277 (1925) (when wife left property upon terms "as shall be provided for the trust established by my said husband's will relating to the residue of his estate, " wife's will established a valid " 'referential' trust... separate and distinct from the trust fund created by her husband"); Newton v. Seaman's Friend Society, 130 Mass. 345, 349, 450 N. 2d 577 (1983). Courts will protect the expectation interest of a beneficiary under a policy. Swanson v. Bankers Life Co., 389 Mass. Court in an interpleader action to determine who to give the money to. Agency, 14 52, 59-61, 436 N. 2d 964 (1982). Cook v. equitable life assurance society conference. 42 Pa. C. S. § 7320(a) makes appealable "[a] court order denying an application to compel arbitration under section 7304. Denied, the court recognized an insured's right to rely on the provisions of the policy in regard to change of beneficiary:"We must reject appellant's contention that the provisions set forth in the certificate, as mentioned above, are for the exclusive benefit of the insurance company and may be waived at will.
Fabiano, 39 386, 387-88 (); Strachan v. Prudential Ins. Trial excerpt, at 428-29. Because of our previous finding that the evidence was sufficient to find negligence, we are compelled to find the evidence sufficient to support a finding that appellants abused any existing conditional privilege. Will that left the insurance policy to. I note that the 16-foot alley said to preclude an interrelationship between the two tracts was at one time owned by the respondents and became a public way through their action, and it is of virtually no use to anyone except Wieboldt and its customers., ) then the fact of acquisition "at different times, from different owners, and for different purposes, " is irrelevant. Cook v. equitable life assurance society for the prevention. In Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 100 F. 2d 266 (1st Cir.
Under this analysis, a partner's reputation leaves a firm with him. W. Shakespeare, Love's Labour's Lost, Act V, scene 2 (1598). There would be no necessity for an allegation, much less the slightest, even prima facie, proof of wrongdoing, or that there had been any mistake made by the company in the apportionment made by it. In her view, the beneficiary designations were testamentary, ergo void, because they relied upon the provisions of a Will which, in contemplation of law, had been revoked. The trial court dismissed appellants' motion and preliminary objections without opinion, and the opinion filed subsequent to appellants' appeal does not address the issue.
See Van Dyke v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Neither were the defendants allowed, upon direct examination, to give facts in support of their opinions as to use and value. 9(3), which uses bad faith as a springboard, does not avail appellant. They lay no foundation for the jurisdiction of a court of equity in such a case, unless it appears that the relation between the policy holder and the defendant is that the latter is the trustee of the former by reason of the trust relation between them resulting from the insurance policy. 621, 627, 382 N. 2d 1065 (1978); see also Rice, op. ¶ 24 Our review of the jury charge reveals the following instructions: If you do so find in favor of Mr. Cooke and against the defendants, you must also determine for the purposes of damages whether the defendants acted intentionally, recklessly or negligently. The district court entered summary judgment for the insurer because the record contained "no indication of bad faith on the part of [Equitable]" in bringing the interpleader and paying the 30% share into court. Lacking legal justification for withholding appellant's benefits and placing them into the court's registry, the insurer fell short of the standard set by ch. It may well be that the joint ownership of these parcels is convenient or even beneficial, yet it cannot be said that the elimination of the free parking facilities. Boston Edison Co. FERC, 856 F. 2d 361, 365 (1st Cir. Of USAnnotate this Case. Nothing in the record suggests otherwise. The district court therefore erred in granting brevis disposition on the first counterclaim in plaintiff's favor; Sandra was entitled to a finding.
Listed on the insurance policy trumps the beneficiary listed in the will. On January 28, 1976, Manfred inserted identical beneficiary designations in the two insurance policies, to wit: Pay 70% of the proceeds of this policy to the Trustee named in my Last Will and Testament. "[N]either intent to engage in an unlawful act nor knowledge of its unlawfulness is required in order to establish liability" under the statute. However, prior to his death, decedent orally requested his agent to change the beneficiary, but the change was not made. Notwithstanding the divorce, Manfred executed a last will and testament (Will) in December 1973, bequeathing his residuary estate to Merle as trustee for their children. See also, 44, Insurance § 1785 (1969); 46 C. J. S. Insurance § 1176 (1946); 25 A. L. R. 2d 999 (1952) and Later Case Service (1981); 2A J. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 1078 (1966). App., 422 N. 2d 1261; Moll v. South Central Solar Systems, supra.
One is again reminded of the Bard of Avon: It is not so; for how can this be true, That you stand forfeit, being those that sue? The court may rely upon it to declare a trust, just as courts have justifiably relied on informal papers, e. g., Barrell, supra, intrafamilial correspondence, e. g., Stratton, supra, and jottings on an envelope, e. g., Herman, supra, to establish trusts. In Stover v. Stover, (1965) 137 Ind. 421, was decided in June, 1888, about four years before this contract was made. There shall be no restrictions or limitations on said Trustee, whose discretion and decisions shall not be questioned by any party, including the beneficiaries of this Trust, in anything said Trustee shall do as long as the decision is based on the needs of my children named above as the beneficiaries of this Trust. Instead, "[w]hether a trust was created depends upon the intention of the parties 'manifested by their words and conduct and the end to be accomplished. '
Thus, while recognizing that there were some essential differences respecting the right to change beneficiaries between the associations and insurance companies, the court stated that, "in either case the rights of the beneficiary are dependent upon and fixed by the contract between the assured and the company or association.... " Id. It seems clear that the parking lot is an integral part of the Wieboldt retail operation, and if as a result of condemning the parking property the market value of the store property declines, there should, in justice, be compensation for land damaged but not taken. We note in passing that, once the money was deposited, Sandra moved lethargically in attempting to retrieve the 30% share. Margaret and Daniel recognize that matters relating to summary judgment are controlled by of Procedure, Trial Rule 56. In other words, if the defamatory material is communicated to persons who do not share a common interest in the communication. On December 24, 1965, Douglas married Margaret, and a son, Daniel, was born to them. First, this is not a case where an insurer held back (and enjoyed the use of) funds belonging to an insured. Compare, e. g., Shapiro v. American Home Assurance Co., 616 906, 920 () (though insurer's disclaimer of coverage was unfounded, insureds did not meet their burden of presenting evidence to show willful or knowing violation, or bad faith). As the trial court noted, Federal Judge Charles Smith testified: "I was shocked that anybody would accuse Mr. Cooke of misrepresentation. 12 (1966) (Disciplinary Rule 2-107) (allowing payment of former partner pursuant to separation agreement); 22 N. Title 22, § 1200. Hrant H. Russian, Cambridge, Mass., for defendants-appellees Merle Joy Englehart, individually and as Trustee under the Last Will and Testament of Manfred O. Englehart, John O. Englehart, William L. Englehart, Andrew D. Englehart and Colleen A. Englehart. We find that the record demonstrates that sufficient evidence was presented such that the jury could reasonably infer liability.
Miketic v. Baron, 450 91, 675 A. DiMarzo v. American Mut. Yet she is limited by the operative statute to her "actual damages or twenty-five dollars, whichever is greater. In this area of defamation Mr. Cooke has the burden of proof․ Keep this in mind, the plaintiff such as Mr. Cooke in a defamation case has the burden of proving, one, the defamatory character of the communication. Was being converted to a paid-up term policy with an expiration date 30. years in the future. Thus, contrary to the apparent assumption of the court below, Equitable's perceived good faith was not dispositive of the issue.
Appellants' assertion is without merit. As far as the Trial Court. W. Winkler /s/ Mary A. Winkler". The same relaxed standard holds true for the creation of trusts by contract, including policies of insurance. 2d 273, 274 (1949) (revoked will, though inutile for testamentary purposes, may be of "evidential value as a declaration of the decedent [regarding property not mentioned in later will], to be considered together with the other evidence in the case"). Remember, non-probate. Goodwill is an asset unless the partnership agreement deems it of no value and the course of dealing of the partners confirms that status. Probate of the Will was in no way a condition precedent to distributing the policy proceeds. Nor was this a case where an insurer, after making a partial payment, suddenly discovered a potentially conflicting claim.